Introduces src/crypto_policy_granular.{c,h}, a self-contained parser
for the sectioned crypto-policies allowlist format. The vocabulary is
the one Fedora crypto-policies emits (the same shape the GnuTLS
back-end already uses, endorsed by @asosedkin in
fedora-crypto-policies wolfSSL#60 as the granular alternative to the
single-line @SECLEVEL=N:... cipher string the wolfSSL back-end was
rejected for in wolfSSL wolfSSL#8205).

The module is split in three responsibilities:

  1. Header sniff (wolfSSL_crypto_policy_is_granular):
     looks at the first non-blank, non-comment line. `version = `,
     `override-mode = `, or a `[section]` header => granular file.
     Anything else => legacy.

  2. Parser (wolfSSL_crypto_policy_parse_granular):
     fills a WolfGranularPolicy struct from a NUL-terminated buffer.
     Bounded: 64 tokens per category, 48 bytes per token, 256-byte
     line length, 1 MiB file ceiling. Strict on file format version
     (only version=1 accepted); forward-tolerant on unknown vocabulary
     tokens.

  3. Apply (wolfSSL_crypto_policy_apply_granular):
     drives the wolfSSL public API on a WOLFSSL_CTX from the parsed
     struct. Five sites, in order:
       - wolfSSL_CTX_SetMinVersion
       - wolfSSL_CTX_set_cipher_list (cipher x kx x mac x version
         cross-product against the known TLS suite table)
       - wolfSSL_CTX_UseSupportedCurve (per enabled-group)
       - wolfSSL_CTX_set1_sigalgs_list
       - wolfSSL_CTX_SetMin{Rsa,Dh,Ecc}Key_Sz

     SetMinVersion and set1_sigalgs_list are best-effort: a build
     that lacks TLS 1.0 support or rejects an rsa_pss sigalg the
     policy lists logs a warning and the remaining steps still
     enforce the policy. Cipher list and key-size floors are
     authoritative.

Standalone helpers (derive_cipher_list, derive_sigalgs_list,
min_version) are exposed WOLFSSL_LOCAL so the existing ssl.c parser
can be wired to them in the next commit without source-level
copy-paste.

src/include.am is updated to compile the new file under the existing
!BUILD_CRYPTONLY guard; the file's own contents are gated by
WOLFSSL_SYS_CRYPTO_POLICY so the build is a no-op when that flag is
not defined.

Mapping tables (versions, groups, sig schemes, suite table) follow
the OpenSSL/GnuTLS back-end naming for primitives; the cross-product
is restricted to the Fedora-relevant TLS suites and can be extended
incrementally as further policies enable additional primitives.

Co-Authored-By: Dominik Blain <dominik@qreativelab.io>

Six fixes for the granular allowlist back-end, in response to the
GitHub Copilot pull-request review and the os-check.yml CI matrix
failure on the initial PR (wolfSSL#10541).

1. src/crypto_policy_granular.c top includes.

   The file was using the standalone `#include <config.h>` +
   `#include <wolfssl/wolfcrypt/settings.h>` pattern, which trips
   the include-order assertion in settings.h whenever the build
   defines TEST_LIBWOLFSSL_SOURCES_INCLUSION_SEQUENCE — that is,
   on the upstream `make check linux` matrix (75 jobs failed,
   first observed on CPPFLAGS=-DNO_VERIFY_OID). When the
   module's content is gated behind WOLFSSL_SYS_CRYPTO_POLICY
   and the macro is undefined, the same configuration also hit
   ISO C's empty-translation-unit rule with -Werror=pedantic.

   Switch to `#include <wolfssl/wolfcrypt/libwolfssl_sources.h>`
   (the canonical pattern used by src/ssl.c, src/internal.c,
   src/tls.c) which both establishes the correct include order
   and pulls in types.h / error-crypt.h / logging.h so the TU is
   never empty. The downstream includes of logging.h and types.h
   become redundant and are removed.

2. DTLS-only allowlist no longer derives an empty cipher list
   (Copilot review, src/crypto_policy_granular.c:432).

   The previous derivation matched a suite's `version` field
   (e.g. "TLS1.2") byte-for-byte against the policy's enabled
   protocol tokens. A DTLS-only file (enabled-version = DTLS1.2)
   therefore produced zero cipher rows even though the IANA
   suite identifiers used by TLS 1.x and DTLS 1.x at the same
   minor version are identical. The new helper
   `wcp_protocol_family_enabled()` treats "TLS1.x" and "DTLS1.x"
   as suite-equivalent at the same minor version, in both
   directions.

3. min_version is now scoped to the CTX's protocol family
   (Copilot review, src/crypto_policy_granular.c:545).

   `wolfSSL_crypto_policy_min_version()` used to pick the
   numerically smallest enabled version across both families.
   On a DTLS CTX, that would feed a TLS constant (e.g.
   WOLFSSL_TLSV1_2 = 3) into `wolfSSL_CTX_SetMinVersion()`,
   which rejects it for the DTLS major version and the floor
   was silently dropped. The function now takes an `is_dtls`
   argument and only considers tokens of that family;
   apply_granular() derives `is_dtls` from
   `ctx->method->version.major == DTLS_MAJOR`.

4. Empty derived cipher list is now a hard failure
   (Copilot review, src/crypto_policy_granular.c:559).

   apply_granular() used to skip `wolfSSL_CTX_set_cipher_list()`
   when the derived list was empty and still return success,
   leaving the CTX's default cipher list in place — i.e. an
   allowlist that didn't constrain anything. It now returns
   WOLFSSL_FAILURE in that case, which tears the CTX down in
   the WOLFSSL_CTX_new_ex granular-apply branch of src/ssl.c.

5. wolfSSL_crypto_policy_get_ciphers() reflects the granular
   derivation (Copilot review, src/ssl.c:5473 and :5535).

   Both enable paths mirror the derived cipher list into
   `crypto_policy.str` after a successful granular parse, so
   the public getter no longer returns an empty string while
   `crypto_policy.enabled == 1`. The cipher set is identical
   for the TLS and DTLS families at a given minor version, so
   one derivation feeds both CTX families. Truncation is safe:
   the string is informational; the authoritative apply happens
   per CTX.

6. Cipher-count test helper uses the public stack accessor
   (Copilot review, tests/api.c:30068).

   `crypto_policy_cipher_count()` is replaced by a single call
   to `wolfSSL_sk_SSL_CIPHER_num()`. The manual loop relied on
   out-of-range behavior of `wolfSSL_sk_SSL_CIPHER_value()`.

The DTLS section of test_wolfSSL_crypto_policy_granular() is
extended to assert (a) the global policy cipher list is
non-empty for a DTLS-only fixture (regression guard for fix wolfSSL#2),
(b) the DTLS CTX survives apply_granular (regression guard for
fixes wolfSSL#3 and wolfSSL#4), (c) the derived list round-trips through
`wolfSSL_CTX_set_cipher_list()` on a fresh DTLS CTX. The test
explicitly does not assert on `wolfSSL_get_ciphers_compat()` for
a DTLS SSL: its `sslCipherMinMaxCheck()` compares TLS minor
numbers with DTLS minor numbers, a pre-existing TLS-vs-DTLS
quirk unrelated to the granular back-end.

Verified against five local build configurations on Ubuntu
24.04 + gcc 13: (1) `CPPFLAGS=-DNO_VERIFY_OID` (the original
failing CI config) — clean; (2) `--enable-all --enable-dtls
--enable-dtls13 --with-sys-crypto-policy=...` — make check
17/17 pass; (3) default `./configure` — make check 5/5 pass;
(4) `--enable-all` + `-pedantic -Werror -fsanitize=undefined
-O1` — build clean (a pre-existing UBSan finding in
src/ssl_crypto.c DES code is unrelated); (5) `--enable-dtls
--enable-dtls13` + DTLS-only policy — our test passes.

Co-Authored-By: Dominik Blain <dominik@qreativelab.io>

Address the check-source-text failure on PR wolfSSL#10541, commit
0b95179: the 8-bit scan in pre-commit/check-source-text.sh
flagged ten non-ASCII bytes (em-dash U+2014 and intersection
U+2229) that had crept into commentary in
src/crypto_policy_granular.c and tests/api.c.

Replace each em-dash with " -- " and the lone "intersect"
glyph with the word "intersect". Comments-only change; no
code, no fixtures, no test logic touched. Diff is 10
insertions / 10 deletions across the two files.

Verified post-fix:
  grep -rP '[^\x00-\x7F]' src/crypto_policy_granular.c tests/api.c
  -> no matches.

Co-Authored-By: Dominik Blain <dominik@qreativelab.io>